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Abstract
In a classical optimal stopping problem in continuous time the agent can choose
any stopping time without constraint. Dupuis and Wang (Optimal stopping
with random intervention times, Advances in Applied Probability, 34, 141–157,
2002) introduced a constraint on the class of admissible stopping times which
was that they had to take values in the set of event times of an exogenous,
time-homogeneous Poisson process. This can be thought of as a model of finite
liquidity. In this article we extend the analysis of Dupuis and Wang to allow the
agent to choose the rate of the Poisson process. Choosing a higher rate leads
to a higher cost. Even for a simple model for the stopped process and a simple
call-style payoff, the problem leads to a rich range of optimal behaviours which
depend on the form of the cost function. Often the agent accepts the first offer
— if they are not going to accept an offer then there is no point in putting in
effort to generate offers, and thus there may be no offers to accept or decline —
but for some set-ups this is not the case.
Keywords: Optimal stopping, Poisson process, Liquidity
2010 MSC: 60G40
1. Introduction
Optimal stopping problems are widespread in economics and finance (and
other fields) where they are used to model asset sales, investment times and the
exercise of American-style options. In typical applications an agent observes
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a stochastic process, possibly representing the price of an asset, and chooses a5
stopping time to maximise the expected discounted value of a payoff which is
contingent upon the process evaluated at that time.
Implicit in the classical version of the above problem is the idea that the
agent can sell the asset (decide to invest, exercise the option) at any moment of
their choosing. For financial assets traded on an exchange this is a reasonable10
assumption. However, for other classes of assets, including those described as
‘real assets’ by, for example, Dixit and Pindyck [1], this assumption may be less
plausible. Here we are motivated by an interpretation of the optimal stopping
problem above in which an agent has an asset for sale, but can only complete
the sale if they can find a buyer, and candidate buyers are only available at15
certain isolated instants of time.
In this work we model the arrival of candidate purchasers as the event times
of a Poisson process. When a candidate purchaser arrives the agent can choose
to sell to that purchaser, or not. If a sale occurs then the problem terminates,
otherwise the candidate purchaser is lost, and the problem continues. If the20
Poisson process has a constant rate, then the analysis falls into the framework
studied by Dupuis and Wang [2] and Lempa [3].
Dupuis and Wang [2] and Lempa [3] discuss optimal stopping problems, but
closely related is the work of Rogers and Zane [4] in the context of portfolio op-
timisation. Rogers and Zane consider an optimal investment portfolio problem25
under the hypothesis that the portfolio can only be rebalanced at event times of
a Poisson process of constant rate, see also Pham and Tankov [5] and Ang, Pa-
panikolaou and Westerfield [6]. The study of optimal stopping problems when
the stopping times are constrained to be event times of an exogenous process is
relatively unexplored, but Guo and Liu [7] study a problem in which the aim is30
to maximise a payoff contingent upon the maximum of an exponential Brownian
motion and Menaldi and Robin [8] extend the analysis of Dupuis and Wang [2]
to consider non-exponential inter-arrival times. As a generalisation of optimal
stopping, Liang and Wei [9] consider an optimal switching problem when the
switching times are constrained to be event times of a Poisson process, see also35
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Lempa [10].
In this article we consider a more sophisticated model of optimal stopping
under constraints in which the agent may expend effort in order to increase
the frequency of the arrival times of candidate buyers. (Note that the problem
remains an optimal stopping problem, since at each candidate sale opportunity
the agent optimises between continuing and selling.) In our model the agent’s
instantaneous effort rate Et affects the instantaneous rate Λt of the Poisson
process, so that the candidate sale opportunities become the event times of an
inhomogeneous Poisson process, where the agent chooses the rate. However,
this effort is costly, and the agent incurs a cost per unit time which depends
on the instantaneous effort rate. The objective of the agent is to maximise the
expected discounted payoff net the expected discounted costs. In particular, if
X = (Xt)t≥0 with X0 = x is the asset price process, g is the payoff function,
β is the discount factor, E = (Et)t≥0 is the chosen effort process, Λ = (Λt)t≥0
given by Λt = Ψ(Et) is the instantaneous rate of the Poisson process, CE is the
cost function so that the cost incurred per unit time is CE(Et), and TΛ is the
set of event times of a Poisson process, rate Λ, then the objective of the agent









over admissible effort processes E and TΛ-valued stopping times τ . Our goal
is to solve for the value function, the optimal stopping time and the optimal
effort, as represented by the optimal control process E. In the context of the
problem it is natural to assume that Ψ and CE are increasing functions, so that40
Ψ−1 exists, and C = CE ◦Ψ−1 is increasing. Then it is possible to use the rate
of the Poisson process as the control variable by writing CE(Et) = C(Λt).
Our focus is on the case where X is an exponential Brownian motion, but
the general case of a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion can be reduced to
this case at the expense of slightly more complicated technical conditions. See45
Lempa [3] for a discussion in the constant arrival rate case. We begin by rig-
3
orously stating the form of the problem we will study. Then we proceed to
solve for the optimal effort process and stopping rule in (1). It turns out that
there are two distinctive cases depending on the shape of C or more precisely
on the finiteness or otherwise of limλ↑∞
C(λ)
λ . Note that it is not clear a priori50
what shape C = CE ◦ Ψ−1 should take, beyond the fact that it is increasing.
Generally one might expect an increasing marginal cost of effort and a law of
diminishing returns to effort which would correspond to convex CE , concave Ψ
and convex C. But a partial reverse is also conceivable: effort expended below
a threshold has little impact, and it is only once effort has reached a critical55
threshold that extra effort readily yields further stopping opportunities. In this
case Ψ would be convex and C might be concave.
One outcome of our analysis is that the agent exerts effort to create a pos-
itive stopping rate only if they are in the region where stopping is optimal.
Outside this region, they typically exert no effort, and there are no stopping60
opportunities. Typically therefore, (although we give a counterexample in an
untypical case) the agent stops at the first occasion where stopping is possible
and the optimal stopping element of the problem is trivial.
2. The set-up, notation and preliminary results
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F = (Ft)t≥0) which satisfies
the usual conditions and which supports a Brownian motion and an independent
Poisson process. On this space there is a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion
process X = (Xt)t≥0 driven by the Brownian motion. We will assume that X is
exponential Brownian motion with volatility σ and drift µ and has initial value
x; then
dXt = σXtdWt + µXtdt, X0 = x.
Here µ and σ are constants with µ < β. Let L = LX denote the generator of65
X so that LXf = 12σ
2x2f ′′ + µxf ′.
The agent has a perpetual option with increasing payoff g : R+ 7→ R+ of
linear growth. In our examples g is an American call: g(x) = (x−K)+. (Here,
4
and throughout, K is a given non-negative constant, known in the financial
context as the strike.) Then, in the classical setting, the problem of the agent70
would be to maximise E[e−βτg(Yτ )] over stopping times τ . Note that the linear
growth condition on g, together with µ < β, is sufficient to ensure that this
classical problem is well-posed.
We want to introduce finite liquidity into this problem, in the sense that we
want to incorporate the phenomena that in order to sell the agent needs to find a75
buyer, and such buyers are in limited supply. In the simplest case buyers might
arrive at event times of a time-homogeneous Poisson process with rate λ. Then
at each event time of the Poisson process the agent faces a choice of whether
to sell to this buyer at this moment or not; if yes then the sale occurs and the
optimal stopping problem terminates, if no then the buyer is irreversibly lost,80
and the optimal stopping problem continues. We want to augment this problem
to allow the agent to expend effort (via networking, research or advertising) in
order to increase the flow of buyers. There is a cost of searching in this way —
the higher the effort the higher the rate of candidate stopping times but also
the higher the search costs. Note that once the asset is sold, effort expended on85
searching ceases, and search costs thereafter are zero by fiat.
Let AE be the set of admissible effort processes. We assume that E ∈ AE
if E = (Et)t≥0 is an adapted process such that Et ∈ IE for all t ∈ [0,∞) where
IE ⊂ R+ is an interval which is independent of time. Then, since Λt = Ψ(Et)
we find E ∈ AE if and only if Λ ∈ A where Λ ∈ A if Λ is adapted and Λt ∈ I90
for all t where I = Ψ(IE). A is the set of admissible rate functions. Note that
I is an interval in R+, and we take the lower and upper endpoints to be λ and
λ respectively.
Recall that TΛ is the set of event times of an inhomogeneous Poisson process
with rate Λ. Then TΛ = {TΛ1 , TΛ2 , . . .} where 0 < TΛ1 and TΛn < TΛn+1 almost
surely. Let T (TΛ) be the set of TΛ-valued stopping times. Then, after a change
5













together with the optimal rate function Λ∗ = (Λ∗t )t≥0 and optimal stopping rule
τ∗ ∈ T (TΛ).95
In addition to the set of admissible controls, we also consider the subset of
integrable controls I ⊆ A where Λ ∈ I = I(I, C) is an adapted process with
Λt ∈ I for which Ex[
∫∞
0





< ∞ for any admissible Λ and any stopping rule, and
hence there is no loss of generality in restricting the search for the optimal rate100
function to the set of integrable controls.
2.1. Some results for classical problems
For future reference we record some results for classical problems in which
agents can stop at any instant.




(Imagine a standard, perpetual, American-style call option with strikeK, though
valuation is not taking place under the equivalent martingale measure.) Classi-
cal arguments1 (McKean [11], Peskir and Shiryaev [12]) give that 0 < wK < x
(the upper bound holds since we are assuming β > µ) and that there exists a
1Here we are assuming that X is exponential Brownian motion. Then there is a pair of
non-negative, monotonic, convex solutions to LXh = βh, (one increasing and one decreasing)
namely h(x) = xθ and h(x) = xφ. If we consider the case where X is a different time-
homogeneous diffusion, then again we can find a pair (θX , φX) of linearly independent, non-
negative, convex solutions to LXh = βh. Much of the subsequent analysis goes through, but
with xθ and xφ replaced with θX(x) and φX(x), see Lempa [3]. Most of the innovation which
arises from the extension from exponential Brownian motion to a general time-homogeneous
diffusion arises from the consideration of different boundary behaviours.
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+ 2βσ2 such that
wK(x) =
 (x−K)+, x > L;(L−K)L−θxθ, 0 < x ≤ L.














+ 2βσ2 . Then θ and φ are




σ2ψ(ψ − 1) + µψ − (β + λ). (3)












(Imagine a perpetual, American-style call option with strike K, in which the
agent pays a fee or transaction cost ε to exercise the option, and pays a running
cost δ per unit time until the option is exercised.) Note that wK,0,0 ≡ wK . It
turns out that there are two cases. The first case is when ε ≥ δ/β. Then, when
X is small it is more cost effective to pay the running cost indefinitely than to
pay the exercise fee. We find
wK,ε,δ(x) = wK+ε−δ/β(x)− δ/β.
The second case is when ε < δ/β. Then, when X is small it is cost-effective
to stop immediately, even though the payoff is zero, because paying the fee is
cheaper than paying the running cost indefinitely. In this case we seek a pair of
thresholds l∗ = l∗(K, ε, δ) and L∗ = L∗(K, ε, δ) with 0 < l∗ < K+ ε < L∗ which
together with w = wK,ε,δ satisfy the variational problem
{w is C1; w = −ε on (0, l∗); Lw − βw = δ on (l∗, L∗); w = x−K − ε on (L∗,∞) }.
7
Returning to our problem with limited stopping opportunities, one immedi-
ate observation is that H(x) ≤ wK(x). Conversely, if Λ ≡ 0 is admissible then
H(x) ≥ −C(0)β .
2.2. Conjugates
Let J be a subinterval of [0,∞) with endpoints {λ, λ} and with the property110
that J is closed on the left and closed on the right if λ <∞.
Let f : J 7→ [0,∞] be a lower semi-continuous, increasing, convex func-
tion. Define f̃ : R+ 7→ R to be the concave conjugate of f so that f̃(z) =
infλ∈J{f(λ)− λz}. Define Θf (z) = arginfλ∈J{f(λ)− λz}.
Note that we allow {λ ∈ J : f(λ) =∞} to be non-empty, but our assumption115
that f is lower semi-continuous means that f(λ̌) = limλ↑λ̌ f(λ) where λ̌ :=
inf{λ ∈ J : f(λ) =∞}.
Let f ′ denote the right-derivative of f and set f ′ = ∞ on [λ̌,∞). Since f ′
is increasing it has a left-continuous inverse Df . In particular, Df : [0,∞) 7→
[0,∞] is given by Df (z) = inf{λ ∈ J : f ′(λ) ≥ z}, with the conventions that120
Df (0) = 0 and for z > 0, if f
′(λ) ≥ z on J then Df (z) = λ. Note that
Df (z) ≤ λ̌. If λ =∞ and limλ↑∞ f(λ)/λ =∞ then Df is well defined and finite
on [0,∞).
Let γ : J 7→ R+ be a lower semi-continuous, increasing function. Let γ̆ be
the largest convex minorant of γ on J . define γ† by γ†(λ) = γ(λ) on [0, λ) (if125
this interval is non-empty), γ†(λ) = γ̆(λ) on [λ, λ] and γ† = ∞ on (λ,∞). By
construction γ† : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞] is convex and we can define Dγ† .
Now suppose that I is the interval of possible values of the rate function
(and that I has the properties of J listed in the first paragraph). Suppose that
C : I 7→ R+ is an increasing, lower semi-continuous cost function. Introduce130
C† : R+ 7→ [0,∞] and DC† which we abbreviate to D† as above. Note that if
D†(z) < λ then z = 0 and D†(z) = 0. Also C†(0) = C†(λ) = C(λ). Given these
facts, the following result is straightforward to prove:




From the Markovian structure of the problem we expect that the (unknown)
value function H and optimal rate function Λ∗ are time-homogeneous functions
of the asset price only.
The stopping rule is easily identified in feedback form. Let T 0Λ = TΛ∪{0} and
let H0 be the value of the problem conditional on there being a buyer available













Then, it is optimal to stop immediately if and only if the value of stopping is
at least as large as the value of continuing and
H0(x) = max{g(x), H(x)}.
It follows that if Λ = (Λt)t≥0 is a fixed admissible rate process, and if H
0
Λ140
and HΛ denote the respective value functions then, writing T1 = T
Λ
1 for the first






















































































(β+Λ∗s)ds (Λ∗t {g(Xt) ∨H(Xt)} − C(Λ∗t )) dt
]
.






























We expect that MΛ is a super-martingale for any choice of Λ, and a martingale







Then we find that H solves
LXH − βH − C̃(H0 −H) = 0, (5)
and a best choice of rate function is Λ∗t = Λ
∗(Xt) where
Λ∗(x) = Θ(H0(x)−H(x)). (6)
Note that H0−H = (g−H)+ and that (5) is a second order differential equation145
and will have multiple solutions. The boundary behaviour near zero and infinity
10
will determine which solution fits the optimal stopping problem.
3.1. First Example: Quadratic cost functions
Suppose g(x) = (x − K)+ for fixed K > 0. Using terminology from the
study of American options and optimal stopping we say that if Xt > K then150
the process is in-the-money and if Xt < K then the process is out-of-the-money.
Further, the region in the domain of X where Λ∗(X) is zero is called the con-
tinuation region C, and S := R+ \ C is the selling region.
Suppose the range of possible values for the rate process is I = [0,∞) and
consider a quadratic cost function C(λ) = a + bλ + cλ
2
2 with a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and155
c > 0. Then C̃(z) = a− [(z−b)+]
2
2c .
Consider first the behaviour of the value function near zero. If a = 0 then
C(0) = 0, and when X is close to zero the agent may choose not to search for
buyers, a strategy which incurs zero cost. There is little chance of the process
ever being in-the-money, but nonethelesss the agent delays sale indefinitely. We160
expect that the continuation region is (0, L∗) for some threshold L∗.
Now suppose a > 0. Now there is a cost to delaying the sale, even when
Λ = 0. If X is small then it is preferable to sell the asset even though the
process is out-of-the-money, because in our problem there are no search costs
once the asset is sold. In this case we expect the agent to search for buyers165
when X is small, in order to reduce further costs. Then the continuation region
will be (`∗, L∗) for some 0 < `∗ < K < L∗ <∞.
Consider now the behaviour for large x. In this case we can look for an





for constants A1, A1/2 and A0 to be determined. Then, when x is large and
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x− (K + b+A0) +O(x−1/2)
)2
+O(x−1/2) = 0.
Equating co-efficients of x2, x and
√
x successively, we find values for A1, A1/2
















Numerical results (see Figure 1) show that this expansion is very accurate for170
large x. All our numerical results are calculated using Matlab and ordinary
differential equation solver ode45.
3.1.1. Purely quadratic cost: a = 0 = b
In this case we expect that the continuation region is (0, L∗) for a threshold
level L∗ to be determined. For a general threshold L, and writing HL for the
solution to (5) with HL(0) = 0 and HL(L) = L−K we find that HL solves
LXh− βh+ 1
2c
({g − h}+)2 = 0. (8)
For x ≤ L we have that HL(x) = L−KLθ x
θ. On (L,∞) we have that HL solves
(8) subject to HL(L) = (L − K) and H ′L(L) = θL−KL . This procedure gives175
us a family (HL)L≥K of potential value functions, each of which is C
1. These
solutions do not cross. If L is too small, then the solution becomes negative; if
L is too big, the solution HL has superlinear growth. Finally we can determine
the threshold level L we need by choosing the value L∗ for which HL∗ has linear
growth at infinity.180
The linear growth solution HL∗ is shown in Figure 1, both for large x
and for moderate x. From Figure 1(b) we see that the continuation region
12
(a) For large x (b) For moderate x
Figure 1: (β, µ, σ,K, a, b, c) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2). In both sub-figures the solid curved line
represents HL∗ ; the straight line represents g ∨HL∗ on {x : g(x) ≥ HL∗ (x)} and the dashed
line in the left sub-figure is the expansion for H in (7). The optimal threshold is seen in the
right sub-figure to be at L∗ = 1.35.
is C = (0, 1.35) and that the stopping region S = [1.35,∞). We also see that
the expansion for H given in (7) gives a good approximation of our numerical
solution for large x.185
Figure 2: (β, µ, σ,K, a, b, c) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2); this figure plots the optimal control Λ∗ given
by (6) as a function of wealth level x.
Figure 2 shows the optimal control. We see that Λ∗ is zero on the continu-
ation region C = (0, L∗) and that Λ∗ is increasing and concave on the stopping
region S = [L∗,∞). The agent behaves rationally in the sense that on the
continuation region where continuing is worth more than stopping, the agent is
unwilling to stop. This is reflected by the minimal efforts spent on searching190
(i.e. Λ∗(x) = 0,∀x ∈ C). Similarly, on the stopping region, stopping is getting
more and more valuable relative to continuing as the price process gets deeper
in-the-money. The agent is incentivised to spend more effort on searching for
13
stopping opportunities.
We discuss the cases of a > 0 and b > 0 in Section 6.195
4. Verification
In this section we show that the heuristics are correct, and that the value
to the stochastic problem is given by the appropriate solution of the differential
equation. Although the details are different, the structure of the proof follows
Dupuis and Wang [2].200
Throughout we make the following
Standing Assumption 1. X is exponential Brownian motion with µ < β and
g is of linear growth.
Definition 1. (τ,Λ) is admissible if Λ is a non-negative, I-valued, adapted
process and τ ∈ T (TΛ).205
Note that a consequence of the definition is that we insist that τ ≤ TΛ∞ :=
limn T
Λ




∞ = 1 so we
are insisting that exercise occurs before this time.) Conversely, we may have
Tk = ∞: in this case we may take τ = ∞. Noting that limt↑∞ e−βtg(Xt) = 0
almost surely, when τ =∞ we set e−βτg(Xτ ) = 0 .210





Clearly, if (τ,Λ) is integrable, then (TΛ1 ,Λ) is integrable.
Lemma 2. Let G be an increasing, convex solution to
LXG− βG− C̃((g −G)+) = 0, (9)
and suppose that G is of at most linear growth. Set G0 = G ∨ g.












Proof. Since g and G are of linear growth we may assume G0(x) ≤ κ0 +κ1x for215
some constants κi ∈ (0,∞).











Fs = F (g(Xs), G(Xs),Λs) := (g(Xs)−G(Xs))+Λs+C̃((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) ≤ C(Λs).


























′(Xs)dWs. Our hypotheses on G allow us to
conclude that N = (Nt)t≥0 is a martingale.








































Since X is geometric Brownian motion and β > µ we have that Xβ,∗ :=













































Then Dominated Convergence, together with the fact that e−βtXt → 0 gives
(10).
225
Remark 1. In our examples where g(x) = (x−K)+ and C takes simple forms
(eg a quadratic) it is clear that there exist C1 solutions to (9). For each example
we consider we can exhibit a convex solution. However, convexity of G is only
required in the proof to show that the local martingale N is a martingale. If this
can be verified by other means, then the convexity assumption is not needed.230
Lemma 3. Let G0 satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 2. Let (τ,Λ) be an integrable
strategy. Define Y = (Yn)n≥0 by
Yn = e




where TΛ0 = 0. Define Gn = FTΛn and set G = (Gn)n≥0.
Then Y is a uniformly integrable (Gn)n≥0-supermartingale.
Proof. We have




Moreover, on TΛn−1 < ∞ and τ > TΛn−1, writing T̃ as shorthand for TΛn − TΛn−1





























Proposition 1. Let G be an increasing, convex solution to (9) of at most linear
growth. Then H ≤ G.
Proof. Let (τ,Λ) be any integrable strategy.











Moreover, since Y is a uniformly integrable supermartingale,















Taking a supremum over stopping times and rate processes we conclude that240
H(x) ≤ G(x).
Our goal now is to show that H = G. We prove this result, first in the
simplest case where the set of admissible rate processes is unrestricted (i.e. Λt
takes values in I = [0,∞) and the cost function C is lower semi-continuous and
convex, with limλ↑∞ C(λ)/λ = ∞). Then we argue that the same result holds245
true under weaker assumptions. Note that we allow for {λ ∈ I : C(λ) =∞} to
be non-empty, but our assumption that C is lower semi-continuous means that
if λ̌ = inf{λ : C(λ) =∞} then C(λ̌) = limλ↑λ̌ C(λ).
Theorem 1. Suppose I = [0,∞) and C : I 7→ [0,∞] is increasing, convex
and lower semi-continuous with limλ↑∞ C(λ)/λ = ∞. Let G be an increasing,250
convex solution to (9) of at most linear growth. Then H = G.
Proof. Let D = DC denote the left-continuous inverse of C
′ as constructed in
Section 2.2. Recall that D(0) = 0.
Let Λ̂ = (Λ̂s)s≥0 be given by Λ̂s = D((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+). We will show that
Λ̂ is the optimal rate process.255
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Note first that there is equality in (11), and therefore in (10), provided Fs =
F (g(Xs), G(Xs),Λs) = (g(Xs)−G(Xs))+Λs + C̃((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) = C(Λs).
This is satisfied if Λs = Λ̂s.
Let X> = {x : g(x) > G(x)} and let X≤ = {x : g(x) ≤ G(x)}. Then, under
the hypothesis of the theorem, whilst X· ∈ X≤ we have that Λ̂· ≡ 0. Hence260
(almost surely) X
T Λ̂1
∈ X> and G0(XT Λ̂1 ) = g(XT Λ̂1 ). Then, taking T = T
Λ̂
1 we
















and hence, combining with Proposition 1, G = H.
Corollary 1. Λ∗ = (Λ∗s)s≥0 given by Λ
∗
s = D((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) is an optimal
strategy, and τ∗ = TΛ
∗
1 is an optimal stopping rule.265
Our goal now is to extend Theorem 1 to allow for more general admissibility
sets and cost functions.
Theorem 2. Suppose I ⊆ [0,∞) is an interval with the properties described
in the opening paragraph of Section 2.2. Let C : I 7→ R be increasing, lower
semi-continuous and such that if λ is infinite then limλ↑∞
C(λ)
λ =∞. Let G be270
an increasing, convex solution of (9) and suppose G is of linear growth. Then
H = G.
Proof. Introduce C†, defined from C as in Section 2.2 and let H† be the solution
of the unrestricted problem (ie I† = [0,∞)) with (convex) cost function C†.
Note that since C̃ = C̃† we have by Theorem 1 that H† = G. It remains to275
show that H = H†.
The inequality H ≤ H† is straight-forward: if (τ,Λ) is admissible for the
interval I and integrable for cost function C, then it is admissible for the interval
[0,∞) and integrable for cost function C†; moreover C ≥ C†, and so H ≤ H†.
18
For the converse, let Λ† given by Λ†s = D
†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) and τ † = TΛ
†
1










Define Λ∗ = λ ∨ Λ† and τ∗ = τ †. Then, by Lemma 1,
C(Λ∗s) = C((D
†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+)∨λ)∧λ) = C†(D†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+)) = C†(Λ†s).
Moreover, Λ∗ ∈ [λ, λ] and is admissible for the original problem with admissi-












Remark 2. Note that Λ∗ ≥ Λ† and we may have strict inequality if λ > 0. In
that case, when g(Xs) ≤ G(Xs) we have Λ†s = 0, but Λ∗s = λ. In particular, we
may have τ∗ > TΛ
∗
1 , and the agent does not sell at the first opportunity. See
Section 6.3.
5. Concave cost functions285
In this section we provide a complementary result to Theorem 1 by consider-
ing a concave cost function C (defined on I = [0,∞)). Throughout this section
we assume g(x) = (x−K)+ for fixed K. In the numerical examples we will take
K = 1.
Suppose C is increasing and concave on [0,∞). Then the greatest convex
minorant C̆ of C is of the form
C̆(λ) = δ + ελ
19
for some constants δ, ε ∈ [0,∞). Then, C and C̆ have the same concave con-290
jugates given by C̃(z) := infλ>0{C(λ) − λz} where C̃(z) = δ for z ≤ ε and
C̃(z) = −∞ for z > ε.
From the heuristics section we expect the value function to solve (5). Then
we might expect that on g −H < ε we have
LXH − βH − δ = 0. (12)
On the other hand some care is needed to interpret LXH − βH = C̃((g−H)+)
on the set g −H > ε. In fact, as we argue in the following theorem, H ≥ g − ε












The intuition is that when H > g − ε it is optimal to wait and to take Λ = 0
at cost δ per unit time. However, on H < g − ε (and also when H = g − ε) it
is optimal to take Λ as large as possible. Since there is no upper bound on Λ,295
this corresponds to taking Λ infinite — such a choice is inadmissible but can
be approximated with ever larger finite values. Then, in the region where the
agent wants to stop, if the stopping rate is large, say N , then the expected time
to stop is N−1, the cost incurred per unit time is C(N) ≈ δ + εN , and so the
expected total cost of stopping is approximately δ+εNN ≈ ε. Effectively the agent300
can choose to sell (almost) instantaneously, for a fee or fixed transaction cost
of ε. This explains why the problem value is the same as the problem value for
(13).
Theorem 3. Let I = [0,∞) and let C : I 7→ R+ be non-negative, increasing
and concave. Suppose the greatest convex minorant C̆ of C(λ) is of the form305
C̆(λ) = δ + ελ for non-negative constants δ and ε.
Then H(x) = wK,ε,δ(x).
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Proof. First we show that for any integrable τ and Λ
Ex
[






Then we show that there is a sequence of admissible strategies for which the
value function converges to this upper bound.
We prove the result in the case ε ≥ δ/β when the cost of taking Λ = 0 is310
small relative to the proportional cost C(λ)/λ associated with taking Λ large.
The proof in the case ε < δ/β is similar, but slightly more complicated in certain
verification steps, because the explicit form of wK,ε,δ is not so tractable.
When ε ≥ δ/β we have that w = wK,ε,δ is given by
w(x) =
 Axθ − δβ x ≤ L(x−K − ε) x > L ,
where L = β(K+ε)−δβ
θ
θ−1 and A =
1
θL
1−θ. Let w0(x) = w(x) ∨ (x−K)+. Note




β−µ and L >
β(K+ε)−δ
β−µ .315




















′(Xs)dWs. Then N = (Nt)t≥0 is a martin-
gale and






LXw − (β + Λt)w + Λtw0 − C(Λt)
]
dt. (14)
On (0, L), LXw − βw = δ, and (14) becomes




(β+Λs)ds[δ − Λtw + Λtw0 − C(Λt)]dt




0 − w − ε)]dt ≤ dNt.
since w0 ≤ w+ ε. Similarly, on (L,∞), w(x) = (x−K)− ε and since L > K+ ε,
21
(14) yields
dMΛt ≤ dNt + e−
∫ t
0
(β+Λs)ds[µXt − (β + Λt)(Xt −K − ε) + Λt(Xt −K)− (δ + εΛt)]dt




(β+Λs)ds[(µ− β)(Xt − L) + (µ− β)L+ β(K + ε)− δ]dt
≤ dNt.
Putting the two cases together we see that MΛ is a supermartingale for any
strategy Λ.320
The rest of the proof that H ≤ w follows exactly as in the the proofs of
Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Proposition 1, with w replacing G.
Now we show that there is a sequence of strategies for which the value
function converges to w = wK,ε,δ. Since δ + ελ is the largest convex minorant
of C there exists (λn)n≥1 with λn ↑ ∞ such that C(λn)λn → ε.325
Consider first the strategy of a constant rate of search λn, with stopping
at the first event time of the associated Poisson process. Let H̃n denote the











































and H̃n(x) → x − K − ε as n ↑ ∞. Suppose ε ≥ δ/β. Let L = β(K+ε)−δβ
θ
θ−1
and let τL = inf{u : Xu ≥ L}. Consider the strategy with rate Λ̂n = λnI{t≥τL},330
for which selling occurs at the first event time of the Poisson process with this
rate, and let Ĥn be the value function associated with this strategy.
For x ≥ L we have Ĥn(x) = H̃n(x)→ x−K − ε = wK,ε,δ(x).
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where the last line follows from the definition of L and some algebra.335
5.1. An example
In this example we consider a cost function of the form C(λ) =
√
λ. Then
a (plausibly) good strategy is to take Λt = 0 if Xt < L
∗ = θKθ−1 and Λt very
large otherwise. It is immediate that the value function H satisfies H ≤ wK ;
conversely, it is clear from Figure 3 that there exist strategies for which the340
value function is arbitrarily close to wK .
Figure 3: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 3, 1); the highest line is wK = wK,0,0, and the other lines are
the value functions under the rate function Λn(x) = nI{x≥L∗}.
6. Further Examples
6.1. Addition of a linear cost
Let C0 be a convex, lower semi-continuous, increasing cost function, and
consider the impact of adding a linear cost to C0; in particular, let Cb : R+ 7→ R+345
be given by Cb(λ) = C0(λ) + λb for b > 0.
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Then the concave conjugates are such that C̃b(z) = C̃0((z − b)+).
Suppose further that G, the increasing, convex solution of (9) of linear
growth, is such that G ≥ 0 on R+. The problem solution in the case of a
purely quadratic cost function (recall Section 3.1.1) has this property. Then
({(x−K)+ −G}+ − b)+ = {(x− (K + b))+ −G}+.
It follows that
C̃b({(x−K)+−G}+) = C̃0(({(x−K)+−G}+−b)+) = C̃0({(x−(K+b))+−G}+)
and then that the value function for a payoff (x − K)+ with cost function Cb
is identical to the value function for a cost function C0(x) but with modified
payoff (x− (K + b))+.350
Note that we see a similar result in the expansion (7) for G in the large x
regime.
6.2. Quadratic costs with positive fixed cost
In this section we seek to generalise the results of Section 3.1.1 on purely
quadratic cost functions to other quadratic cost functions. In view of the results355
in Section 6.1 the focus is on adding a positive intercept term, rather than a
linear cost. Indeed the focus is on cost functions of the form C(λ) = a + c2λ
2
for a > 0.




2, C1(λ) = a +
c
2λ




between the last two cases is that in the final case, not searching at all incurs zero
cost, whereas in the middle case, there is a fixed cost which applies irrespective
of whether there is a positive rate of searching for offers or not.










There is a threshold L with L > K, such that H0 > g on (0, L) and H0 < g
on (L,∞). On (0, L) we have that H0(x) = (L −K) x
θ
Lθ




2 = 0 subject to initial conditions H0(L) =
(L − K) and H ′0(L) = θL−KL . We adjust L until we find a solution for which
H0 is of linear growth at infinity.
Now consider C1 with associated value function H1. When X is very small,
there is little prospect of X ever rising above K. Nonetheless the agent faces370
a fixed cost, even if she does not search for offers. It will be best to search for
offers, because although the payoff is zero when a candidate purchaser is found,
it is then possible in our model to stop paying the fixed cost.
Suppose X = 0. If the agent chooses to search for buyers at rate λ then the
expected time until a buyer is found is λ−1. The expected discounted cost until


















This is minimised by the choice λ = λ∗ where λ∗ =
√
β2 + 2ac − β and the














Then H1(0) = −h−∗ . (Another way to see this is to note that at 0 we expect
LXH1 = 0 and therefore H1(0) to solve −βh = C̃(−h) = a− h
2
2c .)375
The value function H1 is such that there exists ` and L with 0 < ` < K <
L <∞ such that H1, ` and L have the properties
(i) H1 is C







2 x < `;
a ` < x < L;
a− 12c (g − h)
2 L < x.
See Figure 4. Considering H1 on (`, L) we have H1(x) = Ax
θ + Bxφ − aβ for
some constants A and B chosen so that H1(`) = 0 and H1(L) = (L−K):
A =





`−φLθ−φ aβ − `
θ−φL−φ(L−K + aβ )
Lθ−φ − `θ−φ
.
Then for general ` and L we can use value matching and smooth fit at ` and L
to construct a solution on (0,∞). Finally, we adjust ` and L until H1(0) = −h−∗
and H1 has linear growth.
(a) The value function H1(x). (b) The optimal rate Λ
∗
1(x).
Figure 4: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost function is C1(λ) = 1 +λ2. The left figure shows
the value function, and the right figure the optimal stopping rate. There are two critical
thresholds ` = `∗ and L = L∗.
In Figure 4 we plot the value function and optimal rate for the Poisson
process for C1(λ) = 1 + λ
2. There are two critical thresholds `∗ and L∗ with380
0 < `∗ < K < L∗. Above L∗ the agent would like to stop in order to receive
the payoff (x − K), and is willing to expend effort to try to generate selling
opportunities in order to receive the payoff before discounting reduces the worth.
Below `∗ the agent would like to stop, even though the payoff is zero, and is
willing to expend effort to generate stopping opportunities in order to limit385
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the costs they incur prior to stopping. Between `∗ and L∗ the agent does not
expend any effort searching for offers and would not accept any offers which
were received.
Now consider the cost function C>(λ) = aI{λ>0}+
c
2λ
2 with associated value
function H>. We have C̃>(z) = 0 for z ≤
√
2ac and C̃> = a− z
2
2c for z ≥
√
2ac.390
As in the pure quadratic case, there is always the option of taking Λ ≡ 0 at
zero cost, so that the value function is non-negative. It follows that H>(0) = 0.
There is a threshold L below which the agent does not search for offers. But,
this threshold is not the boundary between the sets {x : H>(x) > g(x)} and
{x : H>(x) < g(x)}, since when g(x) − H>(x) is small, it is still preferable395
to take Λ = 0, rather than to incur the cost of strictly positive λ. Instead L
separates the sets {x : H>(x) > g(x)−
√
2ac} and {x : H>(x) < g(x)−
√
2ac}.
We find that there is a threshold L with L > K such that on (0, L), H>
solves LXh − βh = a. At L we have H>(L) = (L −K −
√
2ac) and it follows





xθ. Then, on (L,∞), H> solves400
LXh−βh = a− (x−K−h)
2
2c , subject to value matching and smooth fit conditions
at x = L. Finally, we adjust the value of the threshold L until H is of linear
growth for large x.
(a) The value function H>(x) (b) The optimal rate Λ
∗
>(x)
Figure 5: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost function is C>(λ) = I{λ>0} + λ
2. The highest
convex minorant is C̆>(λ) = λ+ [(λ− 1)+]2. (Here we use the fact that
√
2ac = 2.)
In Figure 5 we plot the value function H> and optimal rate Λ
∗
>. We see that
Λ∗> never takes values in (0,
√
2a
c = 1) where C> > C̆>. Either it is optimal to405
spend a non-negligible amount of effort on searching for candidate buyers, or it
27
is optimal to spend no effort.
(a) Comparison of the value functions (b) Comparison of the optimal stopping rates
Figure 6: (β, µ, σ) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost functions we consider are C0(λ) = λ2, C>(λ) =
I{λ>0} + λ
2 and C1(λ) = 1 + λ2. The left figure plots the value functions under optimal
behaviour, and the right figure plots the optimal rates for the Poisson process. For x > 5 we




0. For small x, Λ
∗
1 > 0 = Λ
∗
> = Λ0.
Figure 6 compares the value functions and optimal rates for the Poisson
process for the three cost functions C0(λ) = λ
2, C>(λ) = I{λ>0} + λ
2 and
C1(λ) = 1 + λ
2. Since C0 ≤ C> ≤ C1 we must have that H0 ≥ H> ≥ H1 and410
we see that away from x = 0 this inequality is strict. Indeed, especially for small
x, H0 and H> are close in value. The differences in optimal strategies are more







and thus that even though C1 > C0, the agent searches at a higher rate under
C1 than under C0. Note that, we only have Λ
∗
> > 0 for x above a critical value415
(in our case, approximately 5). Conversely, for C1 there is a second region where
Λ1 > 0, namely where x is small.
6.3. Cost functions defined on a subset of R+
In this section we consider the case where there is a strictly positive lower
bound on the rate at which offers are received. In fact, in our example the420
optimal rate of offers takes values in a two-point set. Nonetheless, we see a rich
range of behaviours.
Suppose Λ takes values in [λ, λ] where 0 < λ < λ < ∞ and suppose C :
[λ, λ] 7→ R+ is increasing and concave. Introduce C̆ : [λ, λ] 7→ [0,∞) defined by
28
C̆(λ) = C(λ) + λ−λ
λ−λ (C(λ)− C(λ)). Finally introduce C
† : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞] by
C†(λ) =

C(λ) λ < λ,
C̆(λ) λ ≤ λ ≤ λ,
∞ λ < λ.
Write a = C(λ) and b = (C(λ)−C(λ))
λ−λ . Then C
† has concave conjugate C̃†(z) =
a− λz for z ≤ b and C̃†(z) = a− bλ− (z − b)λ for z > b.
Suppose first that C(λ) = a = 0. We expect that there are three regions
depending on whether g < h (small x), g− b < h < g (moderate x) or h < g− b
(large x). Then the value function H is positive, increasing and C1 and satisfies
LXh− βh =

0 x < L,
−λ(g − h) L ≤ x ≤M,
−bλ− λ(g − h− b) M < x,
where L and M are constants satisfying 0 < K < L < M which must be425
found as part of the solution, and are such that h(x) > (x − K) on (0, L),
(x−K) > h(x) > x−K − b on (L,M) and (x−K − b) > h(x) on (M,∞). See
Figure 7.
Fix L and consider constructing a solution to the above problem with H(0)
bounded. On (0, L) we have that H(x) = Axθ +Bxφ and the requirement that
H is bounded means that B = 0 and then A = (L −K)L−θ. We then use the
C1 continuity of H at L to find the constants C and D in the expression for H
over (L,M):
H(x) = Cxθ +Dxφ +
λ




Here φ, θ with φ < 0 < 1 < θ are solutions to Qλ(·) = 0 where Qλ(ψ) =
1
2σ
2ψ(ψ− 1) +µψ− (β+λ). Having found the constants C and D, we can find
the value of M = M(L) where H given by (15) crosses the line y(x) = x−K−b.
Then value matching at M gives us the value of E in the expression for H over
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[M,∞):
H(x) = Exφ +
λ
λ+ β − µ
x− (K + b)λ− bλ
λ+ β
,
where φ is the negative root of Qλ(·) = 0. (There is no term of the form xθ
since H must be of linear growth at infinity.) Finally, we can solve for L by430
matching derivatives of H at M .
(a) The value function H. (b) The optimal rate Λ∗.




4. The left figure plots the value function and the right figure plots the optimal rate function.
Λ is constrained to lie in [5, 10], and the cost function is 20I{λ>5}. We see that Λ
∗ takes
values in {5, 10}.
Figure 7 plots the value function and the optimal rate function. The state
space splits into three regions. On x > M the asset is considerably in-the-money
and the agent is prepared to pay the cost to generate a higher rate of selling
opportunities. When x is not quite so large, and L < x < M , the agent is not435
prepared to pay this extra cost, but will sell if opportunities arise. However, if
x < L then selling opportunities will arise (we must have Λ ≥ λ) but the agent
will forgo them. Ideally the agent would choose Λ = 0, but this is not possible.
Instead the agent takes Λ = λ, but synthesises a rate of zero, by rejecting all
offers.440
When C(λ) > 0, the agent will not pay the fixed cost indefinitely when X is
small. The behaviour for large X is unchanged, but the agent will now stop if
offers arrive when the value of continuing is negative, including when X is near




the former case, when X is small it is cheaper to pay the lower cost and to stop
30
if opportunities arise, than to pay the higher cost with the hope of stopping
sooner. In the latter case, the comparison is reversed. We find that H solves
LXh− βh = C̃((g − h)+)
subject to h(0) = −minλ∈{λ,λ}{
C(λ)
λ+β } and the fact that h is of linear growth
at infinity. The solution is smooth, except at points where C̃((g − h)+) is not
differentiable. This may be at K where g is not differentiable, or when g = h,
or, since C̃ is non-differentiable at b, when g − h = b.




. This means that when x is small the agent expends as
little effort as possible searching for offers, although they do accept any offers
which arrive. There is also a critical threshold M , beyond which it is optimal
to put maximum effort into searching for offers. There are then two sub-cases
depending on whether costs are small or large. If costs are large then the agent450
will always accept any offer which comes along (Figure 8(c) and (d)). However,
when costs are small (Figure 8(a) and (b)), there is a region (`, L) over which
h(x) > g(x) = (x − K)+. Then, as in the region (0, L) when C(λ) = 0, even
when there is an offer the agent chooses to reject it. Effectively, the agent creates
a zero rate of offers by thinning out all the events of the Poisson process.455








. When x is
small the agent searches at the maximum rate to generate an offer as quickly
as possible. Necessarily H(0) < −b. If costs are large enough, then H(x) <
(x− k)+ − b for all x, see Figure 9(a) and (b). Then the agent wants to stop as460
soon as possible, and is prepared to pay the higher cost rate in order to facilitate
this. As costs decrease, we may have (x−k)+− b ≤ H(x) for some x, whilst the
inequality H(x) < (x − k)+ remains true, see Figure 9(c) and (d). Then there
is a region (m,M) over which the optimal strategy is Λ∗(x) = λ. The agent
still accepts any offer which is made. Finally, if costs are small enough we find465
that there is a neighbourhood (`, L) of K for which H(x) > (x −K)+. Then,
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(a) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
1, C(λ) = 20).
(b) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
1, C(λ) = 20).
(c) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
10, C(λ) = 20).
(d) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
10, C(λ) = 20).
Figure 8: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10). The left panels plot the value function and the






. In the case of lower
costs (C(λ) = 1) there is a region (`, L) where H(x) > g(x) and the agent chooses to continue
rather than to stop.
on (`, L) the agent takes Λ∗(x) = λ, but chooses to continue rather than stop if
any offers are made.
As a limiting special case suppose λ = λ = λ̂ and that C(λ̂) = c ∈ [0,∞).










where φ̂ is the negative root of Qλ̂(·) = 0. The value matching condition H(L) =












(a) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
15, C(λ) = 20). b = 1.
(b) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
15, C(λ) = 20).
(c) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
5, C(λ) = 7). b = 0.4.
(d) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
5, C(λ) = 7).
(e) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
2, C(λ) = 2.5). b = 0.1.
(f) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
2, C(λ) = 2.5).
Figure 9: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10). The left column plots the value function and






. Near x = 0 it is
always preferable to choose the maximum possible rate process. Costs decrease as we move
down the rows.
Then first order smooth fit at L implies that







θ − φ̂(β − µ)
λ̂+ β − µ
− λ̂




Note that if we take c = 0 we recover exactly the expressions in (3.12) and
(3.13) of Dupuis and Wang [2].470
7. Conclusion and discussion
Our goal in this article is to extend the analysis of Dupuis and Wang [2].
Dupuis and Wang considered optimal stopping problems where the stopping
time was constrained to lie in the set of event times of a Poisson process. In
contrast, we allow the agent to affect the frequency of those event times. The475
motivation was to model a form of illiquidity in trading and to consider problems
in which the agent can exert effort in order to increase the opportunity set of
candidate moments when the problem can terminate. This notion of effort is
different to the idea in the financial economics literature of managers expending
effort in order to change the dynamics of the underlying process, as exemplified480
by Sannikov [13], but seems appropriate for our context.
Our work focuses on optimal stopping of an exponential Brownian mo-
tion under a perpetual call-style payoff, although it is clear given the work
of Lempa [3] how the analysis could be extended to other diffusion processes
and other payoff functions. Nonetheless, even in this specific case we show how485
it is possible to generate a rich range of possible behaviours, depending on the
choice of cost function. In our time-homogeneous, Markovian set-up, the rate
of the Poisson process can be considered as a proxy for effort, and the problem
can be cast in terms of this control variable. Then, the form of the solution
depends crucially on the shape of the cost function, considered as a function of490
the rate of the inhomogeneous Poisson process.
One important quantity is the limiting value for large λ of the average cost
C(λ)
λ . If this limit is infinite, then the agent does not want to select very large
rates for the Poisson process as they are too expensive. In this case we can
replace C with its convex minorant and solve the problem for that cost function.495
However, if C is concave and the set of possible values for the rate process is
unbounded, then when the asset is sufficiently in the money, the agent wants to
34
choose an infinite rate function. In this way the agent can generate a stopping
opportunity immediately. Choosing a very large rate function, albeit for a short
time, incurs a cost equivalent to a fixed fee for stopping, and this is reflected in500
the form of the value function.
Another important quantity is the value of C at zero. If a choice of zero
stopping rate is feasible and incurs zero cost per unit time, then the agent always
has a feasible, costless choice for the rate function, and the value function is non-
negative. Then, when the asset price is close to zero we expect the agent to put505
no effort into searching for buyers, and to wait. However, if the cost of choosing
a zero rate for the Poisson process is strictly positive, then the agent has an
incentive to search for offers even when the asset price is small and the payoff
is zero. When the agent receives an offer they accept, because this ends their
obligation to pay costs. In this way we can have a range of optimal behaviours510
when the asset price is small.
When the range of possible rate processes includes zero and C is strictly
increasing, then the agent only exerts effort to generate selling opportunities
in circumstances where they would accept those opportunities. The result is
that the agent stops at the first event of the Poisson process, and the optimal515
stopping element of the problem is trivial. However, an interesting feature arises
when there is a lower bound on the admissible rate process. Then, the agent
may receive unwanted offers, which they choose to decline. In this case the
agent chooses whether to accept the first offer or to continue.
We model the cost function C as increasing, which seems a natural require-520
ment of the problem. (However, if C is not increasing, we can introduce a
largest increasing cost function which lies below C, and the value function for
that problem will match the solution of the original problem.) We also assume
that the interval of possible values for the rate process is closed (at any finite
endpoints) and that C is lower semi-continuous. Neither of these assumptions525
is essential although they do simplify the analysis. In particular, these assump-
tions ensure that the minimal cost is attained, and that we do not need to
consider a sequence of approximating strategies and problems.
35
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